I am most honoured to have been asked to deliver this lecture in the series of the Lionel Cohen Lectures in this University. During the years I practised as an advocate I had the privilege and advantage of appearing in London on more than one occasion before a board of the Judicial Committee of Her Majesty's Privy Council of which Lord Cohen was a member. May I respectfully say that in the argument of cases before him I came to appreciate his knowledge of the law and the perceptiveness of his mind in the resolution of complex legal problems. I always appreciated his unfailing courtesy and patience with counsel even when perforce counsel in the course of duty had to put what his Lordship thought was a bad and even an untenable argument. Also, I came to know him personally and joined the wide circle of his friends. I am very delighted to be now participating in a public acknowledgement of Lord Cohen as a jurist and as a man.
But as well, I am honoured to be asked to speak to members of this University in this historic city. I am the more pleased that I have just heard your Dean say that you are now celebrating the twentieth anniversary of the foundation of your Law School, and that you are to move before the commencement of your next academic year to more commodious premises on such a notable and commanding site as Mount Scopus. Allow me to congratulate you on the past success of your school and of its graduates which include your distinguished Dean and to wish your school continuing success.
I follow in the steps of distinguished men who have spoken before me in this series of lectures. I can only hope that my offering this evening will not fall too far short of the standard which they have set. To attain it may be beyond me; to endeavour to emulate them is all I can really do.
I understand I am the first antipodean to be invited to participate in this series of lectures. Also I gather, for the reason to which I have just 2 ISRAEL LAW REVIEW [Is.L.R. Vol. 5.
adverted, I shall be the last to deliver such a lecture in these premises. It seems appropriate therefore that I should respond to a suggestion which has been made to me that I take for my lecture some subject particularly Australian. I know something of your interest in precedent and have thought that some Australian and New Zealand experiences in this field will be of interest to you, though perhaps not of immediate use in the solution of the problems which present themselves to you either now as you study or later as you practise and apply what you have learnt. I wish therefore in this lecture to tell you of some aspects of Precedent in the Southern Hemisphere. You will, of course, pardon an Australian for thinking that Australia and New Zealand may properly be identified with the Southern Hemisphere, as if they filled it entirely. But in truth they are the major countries exclusively following the common law in that hemisphere. As well they are the countries with whose law and legal systems I have most acquaintance.
You will all be familiar with the doctrine of precedent according to the law of England, a doctrine designed to give to the common law coherence, stability and perhaps predictability. Inferior courts are bound by the decisions of courts superior to them in the same hierarchy of courts. Final courts of appeal in any hierarchy as to all decisions, including their own, in general tend to observe the rule expressed as stare decisis. So does any court as to decisions of a court inferior to it in the same hierarchy. That simple statement, however, glosses over the difficult question which perhaps is not yet clearly settled as to what is the decision or, rather, how much of what is involved in a decision, binds as a precedent. As to this, you can find a useful discussion in Professor Rupert Cross' instructive volume, Precedent in English Law, of which there is a recent edition (1968) . It is not my purpose in this lecture to develop that aspect of precedent though very tempted to do so.
You will observe that I have divided the rule as to precedent into two parts, one which spells out the rule for inferior courts as to decisions of courts superior to them in the same hierarchy, and another which treats of the rule for final courts of appeal able to review and reverse existing decisions, including their own decisions, and for all courts as to decisions of courts inferior to them. In strictness the rule stare decisis is, in my opinion, inappropriate to describe the duty of a court bound by the decisions of a superior court, or by its own decisions. It has no option but to follow such decisions. Stare decisis is more properly addressed as it seems to me to a court which is technically free to depart from existing decisions. In that group, as you will have observed, I have included all courts in relation to a decision of a court inferior to them. For those courts the rule is an expression of general policy, a general direction as to the preferred course where alternatives exist. If such a court agrees with the existing decision no question of using the rule arises. It is only when such a court thinks the existing No. 1, 1970] PRECEDENT IN THE SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE 3 decision erroneous that a choice is necessary between overturning it or allowing it, though erroneous, to stand. It is proper at the outset to notice the different process to be followed by final courts of appeal, as compared with that of inferior courts where there are or are said to be decisions claimed to be decisive of the matter in hand. Where it is said that there are such decisions, the first task of a court which would be bound by such a decision is one of research in which, as in the performance of all its functions, it both needs and is entitled to the utmost assistance of the practising profession. That research may be, in part, of a mechanical kind in which the indices and digests of the law are helpful but by no means always adequate. Individual memory derived from practice and wide reading is often invaluable. Having found binding authority the court bound by it has only to apply it. That is often, of course, the more difficult task, the part which gives rise to most appeals. If, however, nothing better than obiter dicta are found, the court needs then to consider the weight and validity of such expressions of opinion and, as well, to observe whatever tendencies in principle in relation to the matter in hand which the court can perceive in the decisions or the reasoning of the courts which are superior to it in the same hierarchy. After all, if the court is not compelled by binding authority and must decide for itself, it is, I think, in the public interest that it should endeavour to find that decision, if there be any choice, which it believes its superior court is likely to favour.
One naturally expects therefore, in general, a greater measure of reference to authority in the reasons for judgment of a court which is not a final court of appeal than would be found in the reasons for judgment of a court of the latter kind. In the former case, justification for its decision is to be found in existing authority and its application. In the latter case, the authority is more likely to be made by the court's own decision: but, even in that case the consonance of the decision with what I might call the flow and direction of the common law, as already accepted, may need to be indicated by reference in the reasons for judgment to past decisions or to the course of past decisions.
For the final court of appeal the task is somewhat different. It has, of course, the main mechanical task of research, though probably over a wider field than that which is appropriate to the court below. In this, it can properly expect the benefit of the work of the court below. Always, in my opinion, the assistance of legally trained librarianship, able to produce a bibliography of a subject, is of great assistance to such a court; and as the volume of the law reports continues to grow and the legal journals to proliferate both in number and in range of subject matter, such librarian assistance becomes wellnigh indispensable. Having found relevant authority the final court of appeal, perhaps not in every case, but at least in many cases, in my opinion, needs to consider the correctness and at times the appropriateness to current circumstances of the decision or decisions which if accepted would of them-4 ISRAEL LAW REVIEW [Is.L.R. Vol. 5.
selves control the resolution of the case. One cannot doubt that the force of stare decisis is bound to be felt and respected by such a court in deciding a matter of general law. Indeed in such cases its weight can only be overcome in a clear case where the final court of appeal is convinced of the incorrectness or inappropriateness of the decision or decisions. Constitutional interpretation may, in my opinion, stand in a different situation. In the case of a final court of appeal Cardozo's words are particularly apt and applicable. He says, in The Nature of the Judicial Process (Yale, 1965) at pp. 19-21:
"None the less, in a system so highly developed as our own, precedents have so covered the ground that they fix the point of departure from which the labor of the judge begins. Almost invariably, his first step is to examine and compare them. If they are plain and to the point, there may be need of nothing more. Stare decisis is at least the everyday working rule of our law. I shall have something to say later about the propriety of relaxing the rule in exceptional conditions. But unless those conditions are present, the work of deciding cases in accordance with precedents that plainly fit them is a process similar in its nature to that of deciding cases in accordance with a statute. It is a process of search, comparison, and little more. Some judges seldom get beyond that process in any case. Their notion of their duty is to match the colors of the case at hand against the colors of many sample cases spread out upon their desk. The sample nearest in shade supplies the applicable rule. But, of course, no system of living law can be evolved by such a process, and no judge of a high court, worthy of his office, views the function of his place so narrowly. If that were all there was to our calling, there would be little of intellectual interest about it. The man who had the best card index of the cases would also be the wisest judge. It is when the colors do not match, when the references in the index fail, when there is no decisive precedent, that the serious business of the judge begins. He must then fashion law for the litigants before him. In fashioning it for them, he will be fashioning it for others."
I do not propose to go more deeply into these matters. What I have said suffices for the purpose I intend to pursue in the course of this lecture. I want to speak of a problem in precedent which does not and, indeed cannot, arise within Great Britain. I might call it a colonial problem in precedent, not using the word "colonial" in a pejorative sense but as including in the description the former dominions and the now members of the British Commonwealth. To particularise that problem, it springs out of the circumstance that the courts of Australia and those of New Zealand were not at any point of time part of the judicial system of the United Kingdom but throughout belonged to a different hierarchy of courts altogether. For the courts of Great Britain, the House of Lords is the final Court of Appeal and by its decisions all the courts of Great Britain are bound. You will recall the historical steps by which Parliament became a "Their Lordships regard the use of precedent as an indispensable foundation upon which to decide what is the law and its application to individual cases. It provides at least some degree of certainty upon which individuals can rely in the conduct of their affairs, as well as a basis for orderly development of legal rules. Their Lordships nevertheless recognise that too rigid adherence to precedent may lead to injustice in a particular case and also unduly restrict the proper development of the law. They propose, therefore, to modify their present practice and, while*.treating former decisions of this House as normally binding, to depart from a previous decision when it appears right to do so. In this connection they will bear in mind the danger of disturbing retrospectively the basis on which contracts, settlements of property and fiscal arrangements have been entered into and also the special need for certainty as to the criminal law. This announcement is not intended to affect the use of precedent elsewhere than in this House." ([1966] deployment of common law principles to particular adjustments of the rights and obligations of the community conformably to current mores and prevailing social and economic conditions. In this connection it is worth pausing to note two passages from the speeches of Lord Reid which, though made before the Chancellor's announcement, give some indication of a willingness to utilize the power of a final appellate tribunal to develop the common law:
"I have never taken a narrow view of the functions of this House as an appellate tribunal. The common law must be developed to meet changing economic conditions and habits of thought, and I would not be deterred by expressions of opinion in this House in old cases. But there are limits to what we can or should do. If we are to extend the law it must be by the development and application of fundamental principles. We cannot introduce arbitrary conditions or limitations: that must be left to legislation. And if we do in effect change the law, we ought in my opinion only to do that in cases where our decision will produce some finality or certainty. If we disregard technicalities in this case and seek to apply principle and common sense, there are a number of other parts of the existing law of hearsay susceptible of similar treatment, and we shall probably have a series of appeals in cases where the existing technical limitations produce an unjust result. If we are to give a wide interpretation to our judicial functions questions of policy cannot be wholly excluded, and it seems to me to be against public policy to produce uncertainty. The only satisfactory solution is by legislation following on a wide survey of the whole field, and I think that such a survey is overdue. A policy of make do and mend is no longer adequate. The most powerful argument of those who support the strict doctrine of precedent is that if it is relaxed, judges will be tempted to encroach on the proper field of the legislature, and this case to my mind offers a strong temptation to do that which ought to be resisted. The existence of such a power is emphasised and I would hope its use encouraged by the Lord Chancellor's statement. If you will permit me to do so I would quote a passage from a recent judgment of my own in which I referred to the Lord Chancellor's announce-No. 1, 1970] PRECEDENT IN THE SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE 7 ment. It will also serve as some indication of the current thinking of at least one Justice of the High Court as to the use to be made of the judicial power of decision exercisable by a final court of appeal. The case concerned the question whether a person can be liable at law for the consequence of advice gratuitously but negligently given to another:
"The matter so far as this Court is concerned is free of any binding authority. The Court's task therefore is to declare the common law in this respect for Australia. There are indicative decisions in the courts of England; these are to be regarded and respected. With the aid of these and of any decisions of courts of other countries which follow the common law and of its own understanding of the common law, its history and its development, the court's task is to express what is the law on this subject as appropriate to current times in Australia. This will not necessarily be identical with the common law But this does not mean that the judge is at liberty to give effect to his own personal view of what is right and just in the particular circumstance. His decision must be according to the principles of the law, which, it must be conceded, can at times work less than justice. Adherence to the principles of the law but not necessarily to particular decisions therein, is essential to the maintenance of an ordered society. As Cardozo said in his lecture from which I have already quoted (p. 141):
"The judge, even when he is free, is still not wholly free. He is not to innovate at pleasure. He is not a knight-errant roaming at will in pursuit of his own ideal of beauty or of goodness. He is to draw his inspiration from consecrated principles. He is not to yield to spasmodic sentiment, to vague and unregulated benevolence. He is to exercise a discretion informed by tradition, methodized by analogy, disciplined by system, and subordinated to 'the primordial necessity of order in the social life.' Wide enough in all conscience is the field of discretion that remains."
But through the period with which I will be dealing the House of Lords regarded itself as bound by its own decisions. No doubt, this rule led to the more ready acceptance of distinctions between a case under consideration and an earlier decision. By that means some advances in the law were made. But the existence of the rule is important to be borne in mind in what I have to say, that is to say, only an Act of Parliament of the United Kingdom could change the law settled by a decision of the House of Lords.
For the plantations, as the early colonies in America were called, and for colonies such as the Australian colonies, the judicial power of the Sovereign remained. Consequently, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, whose activities were and are regulated by the Judicial Committee Acts, 1833 and 1843, became the final Court of Appeal for the colonies, that is to say, became the top court in the hierarchy of each system of colonial courts. Orders in Council made by the Sovereign fixed the nature of the matters in which such an appeal could be brought as of right: but the power to grant special leave to appeal in any case remained, its exercise being recommended to the Sovereign by that Committee. The Committee is not bound by its own decisions, which constitute advice to the Sovereign, who in form and theory decides each appeal. However, as Viscount Haldane L.C. once No. 1, 1970] PRECEDENT IN THE SOUTHERN HEMISPHEREsaid: "But according to constitutional convention it is unknown and unthinkable that Her Majesty in Council should not give effect to the report of the Judicial Committee who are thus in truth an appellate court of law." The Committee is not bound by the decisions of the House of Lords or by the decisions of any court in the hierarchy of the courts of which the House of Lords is the head.
It was the existence of these two systems of courts with no settled and binding rule to accommodate the decisions of each to the other, which formed part of the ground of the developments in precedent to which I take this opportunity to call your attention. The other part was the loosening of the ties, or as some may have seen them, the bonds of Empire, and the emergence of new nations within the British Commonwealth of nations, many of them, including Australia, becoming, not merely out of national sentiment but out of geographical location and economic considerations, conscious of separateness and independence.
Generally speaking, a desire for uniformity of the common law throughout what was then the British Empire led to the acceptance during the times of that Empire by each of the court systems of the decisions of the other. The interest of the British Government and of British investors in the maintenance of such uniformity, particularly in so much of the common law and of statutory interpretation as touched upon commercial activities, was obvious. It was reflected in the attitudes of the English courts, including the Privy Council, and it was broadly speaking both accepted and promoted by the decisions of the colonial courts staffed as they were to a significant degree, and particularly in early times by expatriate or, at any rate, English-trained lawyers. Whilst no conflict of decision existed between the two judicial systems, no problem arose. But there were occasions when radical differences existed between the decisions of the House of Lords and the decisions of the Privy Council. This situation still obtains, notwithstanding the fact that predominantly the members of the Privy Council who sit on boards of the Judicial Committee are Lords of Appeal in Ordinary who, with the Lord Chancellor, exclusively decide cases brought before the House of Lords in its appellate capacity. Although these occasions of difference in decision were few, their consequence reached far beyond the subject matter of decision.
I am intending to deal with the relationship which developed between the colonial system of courts and those of Great Britain, in relation to precedent and with a change in attitude of Australian courts to English precedent which may be seen in the judgments of members of the High Court of Australia. This change, though not exclusively due to it, broadly parallels and reflects the steady growth of Australia away from a mere colonial situation to a state of nationhood and independence. That passage has been a process spread over a century and a half, characterised by gradualism, with no high peaks of crisis or indeed any turning points marked by resounding circumstance. Along the path from colony to nation, however, one can see changes of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0021223700002302 [Is.L.R. Vol. 5. of mind in the administration of the law with respect to the acceptance of precedents derived from Great Britain. The changes have been evidenced, principally, in the work of the Justices of the High Court. These, at times, almost tentative movements on the part of members of the High Court have not followed a steady or regular progression. There has been a deal of flux and reflux, as I hope the detail of this lecture will show. But a comparison of the commencement with the end of the period I shall cover, leaves no doubt that a change of a fundamental kind has occurred. The change has not only been manifest in the degree of acceptance of English decision or precedent, but in an increasingly critical attitude to the work generally of the English Courts, particularly that of the Court of Appeal.
First, I should say to you something about the court system of Australia. The country began as a colony on the east coast of Australia, unknown lard in those longitudes until James Cook, the great navigator, filled in some of the eastern outline of the Australian continent of which the western end had suffered some discovery and received some delineation. Settlement took place in 1788: the original colony began primarily as a penal settlement, a place to which to transport persons convicted of offences for which the death penalty was the primary punishment, with transportation as a mitigation or merciful alternative. For a period of close on 40 years the colony remained under naval or military governorships, with military or paramilitary courts and without any representative government. Free settlers came early in the life of the colony and, in a relatively short time, outnumbered the involuntary immigrants. From very early times there was agitation for civil courts and ultimately these were conceded by the British Government. I won't trouble you with the historical detail because that, is beside my present purpose. But the following should be noted: by virtue of legislation of the British Parliament in the reign of King George IV, the colonies of New South Wales and of Van Diemen's Land, which soon became the colony of Tasmania and is now the State of Tasmania, were each to be given a Supreme Court, with some provision for inferior courts. All the laws of England which in 1828 were appropriate to the then condition of the colonies became operative. Thus the common law and its system of precedent was clearly introduced into the new land. There was therefore no such room for difference of opinion as-I gather from Professor Yehezkiel Dror's interesting article (Vol. V of Studies in Law) published by your Faculty-has existed here in Israel as to the source of the doctrine of precedent in your court system.
The first colony set up on the eastern seaboard was divided progressively into four separate colonies. Two other colonies were inaugurated-one in the south and one in the west. Each of these new colonies in turn was given a Supreme Court and to each the common law was introduced. The six colonies developed side by side though at different rates of growth, both in terms of population and in their economies. In 1900, after much deliberation, they federated.
No. 1, 1970] PRECEDENT IN iHE SOUTHERN HEMISPHEREDuring the period from the commencement of the Supreme Court in each colony there was an appeal to Her Majesty's Privy Council in London. Each Supreme Court was bound by the decisions of the Privy Council. They were so bound, or at any rate regarded themselves as so bound, not only by decisions on appeal from their respective courts but by any decision of the Privy Council given in any appeal from any colonial court, e.g. from India, Canada and many other British possessions. I do not think this position was ever questioned in Australia in the period to which I am referring, i.e. the pre-federation colonial period, but there has been some discussion of the matter since. I shall later make brief reference to this. The colonial Supreme Courts also seem to have regarded themselves as bound by decisions of the House of Lords where there was no inconsistent decision of the Privy Council.
But the position could and did arise where a decision of the House of Lords disapproved an earlier decision of the Privy Council. That is to say, there was not only difference but a refusal by the one tribunal to accept the decision of the other. What should be done by the colonial courts in such a situation could not be determined by reference to any settled rule. The colonial court could make for itself an estimate of what the Privy Council itself was likely to do if and when the question arose before it, and decide it accordingly: or it might consider itself bound to follow the later decision of the House of Lords. So far as I am aware, this question did not arise for decision in any of the Australian colonial courts in the pre-federation period. Probably they observed the rule which was expressed in 1927, by Viscount Dunedin speaking for the Privy Council. He said: ". . . when an appellate court in a colony which is regulated by English law differs from an appellate court in England, it is not right to assume that the colonial court is wrong. It is otherwise if the authority in England is that of the House of Lords. That is the supreme tribunal to settle English law, and that being settled, the colonial court, which is bound by English law, is bound to follow it. Equally, of course, the point of difference may be settled so far as the colonial court is concerned by a judgment of this Board." (Robins v. National Trust Co. [1927] A.C. 515 at p. 519.) This, with great respect, was a loose and inapt statement in using the expression "the colonial court, which is bound by English law". Precisely stated, the colonial court was bound by the decisions of the Privy Council-not by English law in the abstract or in general, though, of course, the function of the court, subject to the correction of the Privy Council, was to discover and declare the common law of England. No doubt, however, Viscount Dunedin's pronouncement not only represented a current opinion when made, but the views it expressed and which had been entertained over a long period of time, had had a considerable effect on decisions in Australia and New Zealand. 2) (Per Cleary J.) When deciding which of two inconsistent decisions, the earlier of the Privy Council and the later of the House of Lords, are to be followed by the New Zealand Court of Appeal, the question always is whether the Privy Council is likely to adhere to its own earlier decision. Where the House of Lords has made it plain how and in what respects error arose in the earlier case so that it would seem wholly unlikely that there could be any reversion to the earlier decision, the New Zealand Court should follow the decision of the House of Lords."
In contrast with those quotations I should cite a passage from a recent judgment of the Court of Appeal Division of the Supreme Court of New South Wales, part of the hierarchy of courts of which the High Court is the Australian head and by whose decisions the Supreme Court is bound.
That Court said:
"As between the decision of the House of Lords and the Privy Council upon an appeal from an Australian court it seems to us that the law is that which is stated by the Privy Council. There is a direct appeal from the Supreme Courts of the States to the Privy Council which places the Board at the top of the hierarchy of Australian courts. 'It is the ultimate court of appeal in the hierarchy to which our courts belong ' (Bruce v. Waldron [1963] Perhaps the existence of an appeal to the High Court to which the parties may and more usually do appeal rather than to the Privy Council and where the matter may end without any further appeal and the obligation to follow the decision of the High Court, may in some measure explain the noticeable difference in the attitudes of the two courts. But as you will observe from the quotations I have made from the decision of the New Zealand Court of Appeal in 1962, that court has come to the position that whilst it is not bound in all circumstances to follow a decision of the House of Lords, it will do so in general. In exceptional circumstances it feels free to prefer a decision of the House of Lords, particularly where it can feel able to conclude that the Privy Council would itself review its own earlier inconsistent decision and adopt that of the House of Lords.
There is, of course, quite a different attitude to be adopted where there is no relevant decision of the Privy Council. Then quite clearly the Australian colonial court or a New Zealand court, which remained bound by a decision of the Privy Council in a case of the kind before it, might adopt for itself a decision or for that matter the reasoning of the House of Lords, not because it is bound by it, but because it is, in the opinion of the Australian or New Zealand court, a correct exposition of the relevant law. But I anticipate a little in so saying. The question in the past was whether the colonial court was bound in the event of a conflict of decision by the decision of the House of Lords. Viscount Dunedin said that they were and, as I have said, generally speaking, the Australian colonial courts and the New Zealand courts regarded the House of Lords as the final arbiter of the common law and indeed of statutory interpretation, where comparable statutory provisions exist. Looking back, it may seem strange that the courts of the Australian States and of New Zealand, as the colonies and, later, the dominions of Australia and New Zealand, obtained political autonomy as a step towards national independence, should have placed the development of their law in the hands of the Parliament of the United Kingdom, which, to a degree they did by treating themselves as bound by the decisions of the House of Lords, rather than decide for themselves what the common law for their own countries should be and thereafter await the activitv of the Parliament in their own colonv or dominion for any change deemed locally advisable. But, no doubt, it seemed natural enough for those courts to take the course they did as the bonds of Empire had but recently, and then only partially, been loosened. Habits of mind born of that Imperial age not surprisingly persisted. The interest of the United Kingdom in maintaining uniformity of law within the Empire was not-as yet-seen to compete with the colonial or dominion interest in correctness and in appropriateness to the local social and economic conditions.
Thus, the solution of the problem posed by the existence of the two systems of courts in the British Empire was solved in what I might call the colonial period by the colonial courts accepting and following the decisions by the House of Lords, though not bound to do so, unless an inconsistent decision of the Privy Council existed-a decision by which they were bound but which, on occasion, they might feel free to disregard if the particular decision had been disapproved by the House of Lords.
But the question arose as to whether the colonial courts ought to regard themselves as bound by the decisions of the Court of Appeal in England. This is perhaps best taken as the commencing point for my description of a steady movement in precedent in Australia, from a position where the Supreme Courts of the colonies followed decisions of the House of Lords, and the decisions of the Court of Appeal in England, to -the point where the High Court of Australia came to regard itself as not bound nor even persuaded by the decisions of the House of Lords: and indeed decided in important respects otherwise than that House had decided.
I begin the narrative in 1877 when the oldest Supreme Court in Australia, that of the State of New South Wales, was 49 years old. It was set up in 1828. For those interested in such things, it could be mentioned that since the replacement in fairly recent times of a court in the West Indies, the Supreme Court of New South Wales is, as far as I know, the oldest remaining court of the common law order of courts, judicature having displaced those in the United Kingdom. telescoped the two systems of courts, though in terms the decision was limited to the statutory construction of legislative instruments in identical terms. But its general approach was in line with the later judgment of Lord Dunedin. The effect of the case of Trimble v. Hill (supra) and of the willingness of the colonial courts to follow the House of Lords was to maintain some uniformity of the common law and of statutory interpretation throughout the Empire. But it did not precisely conform to the actual theory of precedent. The colonial court might have decided, in the same sense as the English Court of Appeal or of the House of Lords, as the case may be, whatever its own view,, on the footing that the Privy Council itself, influenced by the decision of the House of Lords or of the Court of Appeal, would decide the matter in that sense. But that involves a speculation which may or may not have been justified; or the colonial court may have been convinced of the propriety of the decision of the English Court of Appeal. But that again is another matter. In point of the strict theory of precedent the Court of Appeal was not in the same hierarchy as the colonial court which in consequence was not in strictness bound by the decision of the Court of Appeal. However, the decision of the Privy Council did bind the colonial courts. The situation thus imposed upon the colonial courts by the Privy Council persisted for very many years and where no relevant decision of the High Court exists may be still thought by some, to govern the decisions of the Supreme Courts of the States. At any rate it was the situation at the time of the federation of the Australian colonies in 1900, which is the next event to which I want to call attention.
In the year 1900 the colonists of all the Australian colonies federated and joined in a new Commonwealth. The Parliament of the United Kingdom passed the Constitution Act which erected the Constitution of Australia. This Constitution is a Federal Constitution broadly after the pattern of the Constitution of the United States but without its rigid separation of powers and with the British system of responsible government engrafted upon it.
The Constitution erected the High Court of Australia under that name as the Supreme Court of Australia. It is both the constitutional court and a general court of appeal for all courts in Australia. The right of appeal from the Supreme Courts and from other courts of the States from which in 1900 appeals could go to the Privy Council was constitutionally entrenched and placed beyond the reach of any of the Parliaments-Commonwealth or State. Thus, the immediate effect of federation upon the system of courts in the several colonies, which under the Constitution became the States, was to place the High Court into and make it part of the court system of each State. Subject to appeal to the Privy Council, it became the top court in each such system of courts.
But whilst under the Constitution, appeals in certain constitutional matters could not be taken from the High Court to the Privy Council without the approval of the High Court, the right of the Queen in Council to grant special of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0021223700002302 leave to appeal from the High Court was maintained by the Constitution, subject to the power of the Australian Parliament to make laws limiting the matters in which such leave could be sought. To anticipate a little, the power of limiting the matters in which such special leave to appeal might be granted by the Privy Council has recently been exercised by the Australian Parliament. In respect of matters initiated since 1st September 1968 and involving federal jurisdiction by whomsoever exercised, no such leave to appeal may be granted by the Privy Council. Thus, in respect of all constitutional matters and in all matters involving the exercise of federal judicial power, the High Court of Australia has become absolutely the final Court of Appeal unless the Court certificates a question as to the relative constitutional powers of the Commonwealth and States, or of one State and another, to be proper to be decided by the Privy Council rather than by itself. Power was taken in the Constitution for the Parliament to invest the courts of the States with federal jurisdiction. This, the Parliament had done. Australia has not followed the American pattern of parallel courts, State and federal. Thus, it is to the High Court that appeals may be brought and now can only be brought from State courts where they exercise federal jurisdiction. This covers a very wide area of the law, including the common law. For example, the High Court has jurisdiction in any case in which the Commonwealth is a party, no matter what the cause of action or the law to be applied. Further, the Court has a diversity jurisdiction where residents of different States sue each other. Again, such an action may involve any cause of action. Usually, such a case involves the common law and at least the law of one State. Although the opportunity to invoke the Court's diversity jurisdiction has been reduced by the Court's decision that corporations cannot relevantly be residents, there remains a considerable area of federal jurisdiction covered by the diversity jurisdiction. The courts of the States have been invested with federal jurisdiction in all matters in which the High Court could exercise jurisdiction. Thus, for example in matters between residents of different States, although otherwise they involve no federal question or element, the State court will be exercising federal jurisdiction and no appeal may be taken in the matter to the Privy Council but only to the High Court. But appeals can still be taken to the Privy Council both from the Supreme Courts of the States and from the High Court itself in matters involving only the law of a State which includes the common law in force in the State. It will at once be seen that a decision of the High Court on a matter of common law, decided in an appeal from a State court exercising federal jurisdiction, may well conflict with a decision of the Privy Council in an appeal either from the High Court or direct from a State in a matter involving only State law (including the common law).
Thus a new possibility of conflict of authority has been created: and of course, a new problem in precedent for a Supreme Court faced with antithetical decisions of the Privy Council and of the High Court. However, of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0021223700002302
the future is in a real sense, outside the scope of this lecture. I am more concerned with the past and its developments. Legislation of the Australian Parliament has provided that appeals may be brought as of right, to the High Court with respect to every final judgment of a State court for or in respect of any sum or matter at issue amounting to or of the value of three thousand Australian dollars (approximately IL 11,760), or which directly or indirectly involves any claim, demand or question to or respecting any property or any civil right amounting to or of that value or which affects the status of any person under the laws relating to aliens, marriage, bankruptcy and insolvency.
Leave to appeal against any interlocutory judgment fulfilling any one of the abovementioned qualifications may be given by the High Court. Special leave may be given to appeal against any judgment-final or interlocutory-in any civil or criminal matter.
This addition of the High Court to the judicial system of each State, making it a second court of appeal in all matters civil and criminal, has had, as I think you will observe as I proceed, a far-reaching effect and influence on the development of doctrine as to precedent in the court systems of Australia. At once you will note that through the appellate provisions, the opportunity to pass upon the whole gamut of the law is afforded to the High Court. One of the principal effects of the creation of the High Court has been to enable uniformity in precedent to be achieved within and as between the judicial systems of the several States. Whilst some degree of comity in accepting one another's decisions existed between the courts of the several colonies and now exists between the courts of the States, the decisions of the courts of one colony or State did not and do not bind the courts of another. But through the circumstance that the High Court is part of each judicial system and that its judgments bind the courts of all the States no matter from what State the appeal in which the decision is given has come, much greater uniformity and evenness of the development of the law has been made possible through the existence of the High Court and by means of its decisions. This function of producing uniformity, particularly of the common law, which formerly it had been thought the Privy Council would perform within the former Empire, has been carried out by the High Court in relation to Australia.
Further, doctrines have been developed by the High Court, not always identical with English doctrines by which English courts are governed, but by which the courts of the States of Australia are bound. The possibility of flexible development of the common law appropriate to Australian conditions has been created by the ability of the High Court to review and-if need bein a proper case to reverse its own decisions and also to reconsider and againif need be-to depart from decisions of the English courts with respect to the common law, and also with respect to statutory interpretation.
Whether Later, you will notice that Sir Isaac Isaacs emphasises this obligation to the law rather than the obligation to perpetuate a decision. I now turn to some judgments of the Justices of the High Court to illustrate the influence it has had on the development of precedent in Australia.
The other tribunal where British law is administered by Judges of high attainments, great learning and wide experience. The judgment of such a tribunal when it expresses the considered opinion of its members must always carry very great weight in the estimation of this as of every other court in the Empire. It cannot, however, be said that the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Cuenod v. Leslie (1909) 1 K.B., 880 does express the considered opinion of its members. Although Lord Justice Fletcher Moulton is the only Judge who expresses dissatisfaction with the earlier decision, it is quite evident that the other members of the Court follow it not because they approve of the reasoning, but because it is a decision by which they consider themselves bound. Under these circumstances this Court is, I think, entitled to consider the important question of law raised by Mr. Graham on its merits, unhampered by any binding judicial authority. " (p. 102, 103.) Three points of significance emerge-(1) the High Court was not to regard itself as bound by English decisions, other than those of the Privy Council, though in matters of general law in judicial comity it would in general follow the House of Lords; (2) the State Court rightly followed the decisions of the English Court of Appeal; and (3) the Justices of the High Court were themselves convinced of the error of the decision of the Court of Appeal but the reason they found for not following it was that it had been doubted by the Court of Appeal itself. Thus, early in its history the High Court began to perform a most important function in connection with precedent. It rightly assumed the position of an independent arbiter in Australia, though indicating its willingness, even possibly against its own firm conviction as to the law, to maintain uniformity of principle within the domain of the common law. The addition of a reason beside its own conviction for not following the Court of Appeal is indicative of the place at that time given to the desirability of uniformity of the general law throughout the King's dominions.
In 1913 the High Court had to decide whether or not it would review and reverse one of its own prior decisions. It concluded that it could and in a proper case would do so. In the course of delivering judgment in the case which concerned an aspect of the industrial arbitration system of Australia, Mr. Justice Isaacs (later Sir Isaac Isaacs, Chief Justice of the High Court and later still a distinguished Governor-General of the Commonwealth and the first Australian to hold that office) said: "As to the propriety of reconsidering our prior decisions at all, the question has been recently argued most exhaustively in a case now pending, and we are in a position to express our views upon it. It is, I apprehend, beyond question our duty to accept any rule laid down by the Privy Council on the subject of general judicial conduct. In some cases that body governs us, and in all others it affords an appropriate model for our guidance. Now, the Privy Council has never countenanced the doctrine that its "The oath of a Justice of this Court is 'to do right to all manner of people according to law'. Our sworn loyalty is to the law itself, and to the organic law of the Constitution first of all. If, then, we find the law to be plainly in conflict with what we or any of our predecessors erroneously thought it to be, we have, as I conceive, no right to choose between giving effect to the law, and maintaining an incorrect interpretation. It is not, in my opinion, better that the Court should be persistently wrong than that it should be ultimately right." (p. 278)
The last sentence, uttered so long ago as 1913, is, I think, symptomatic of much current thinking. We have been through a period when the virtues (and they are no doubt virtues) of stability and predictability in the law have been paramount considerations in the decision of cases, and particularly in the consideration of earlier decisions. Today many are not so enamoured of the perpetuation of error or of inappropriateness to current times of old decisions, and favour their review in proper cases by final courts of appeal. Thus, whilst asserting a right to decide for himself if need be, the Justice was clearly reiterating his willingness to consider uniformity of decision within the sphere of the common law both desirable and in many cases a compelling occasion for conformity to a decision with which there was not wholehearted agreement. Also, there was present a like notion to that expressed by the Judges of the Court of Appeal in New Zealand in the passage I have quoted, the idea of considering as part of the reason for not following a decision of the Privy Council in conflict with a decision of the House of Lords whether or not it was likely that the Privy Council would review its own decision if opportunity offered and then accept the view of the House of Lords. In strict theory this attitude is hardly supportable and more recently has not been adopted by the High Court. It should be left by the inferior court to the superior to effect the change. I shall later refer to Jacob v. Utah Construction & Engineering Pty. Ltd. (1966) 116 C.L.R. 200 on this aspect of precedent. There are perhaps exceptions to such a strict application of theory. The New Zealand case and the above-mentioned case in the High Court perhaps afford examples. Our system of law allows no initiative in an appellate court to bring forward a decision of an inferior court, without the parties having made an appeal. Thus a decision below may stand a long time before it is overturned by the 'superior court. Such a situation tends to encourage a departure from the strict theory of precedent comparable to the course of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0021223700002302 described in the cases to which I have referred. A power in the inferior court to send the point of law to the superior court for decision and a wide and restrained use of such a power by the inferior court would clearly obviate the need to make such a departure.
But Hill, as well as the features of the particular question now involved, I have no hesitation in believing it to be my judicial duty to form and declare my own opinion on the point. Moreover, in passing, I would add that, while fully conscious, as already stated in Webb's Case, of the importance of securing uniformity of interpretation in the Empire, that purpose must not be pressed too far. Forty-five years have passed since Trimble v. Hill, and the relative status of the highest Dominion Courts as well as of the Dominions themselves is not the same. InterImperial trade and general communications have become more complex. Logically, on the ground of uniformity, there is as much reason for following a decision of the Supreme Court of Canada or of New Zealand, of the Irish Free State or in some cases of South Africaall of which like our own are under the corrective power of the Privy Council, as for singling out the one Appellate Court of England subject to appeal to the House of Lords. Each case must, in my opinion, be dealt with on its own merits, and in that process every decision of an English Court, original or appellate, is sure to receive our traditional and unfeigned respect. But, short of emanation from a supreme source, every potion should at least be tasted and appraised before being swallowed." Here, the movement is towards self-expression and again the Justice favours the paramountcy of correctness rather than of precedent, particularly where comity rather than strict theory suggests compliance with it. Here too it cannot only be surmised that nascent nationalism was having its influence on of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0021223700002302 ISRAEL LAW REVIEW [Is.L.R. Vol. 5.
the judicial acceptance of English precedent: it is expressed in the learned Justice's references to the separateness of the identity of the new dominions. Also the claims of uniformity of development of the common law in the area of what later became the British Commonwealth of Nations is observed and some emphasis placed upon it. Thus, the position was reached that courts of the States may be bound to follow the English Court of Appeal until the High Court has itself decided the point. Once the High Court has decided, however, and not followed the Court of Appeal, the State Court in turn must follow the High Court and not the English Court of Appeal.
In the following year, however, 1926, the Court in a case by the name of Sexton v. Horton (1926) 38 C.L.R. 240 seemed to pause in its movement towards expression of its own independent views. The question in this case was whether an equitable estate in fee simple required for its creation the use of technical words of limitation, as for such an estate at common law, namely, the use of the word "heirs" as a word of limitation. The High Court in 1917 had decided that such technical words were unnecessary to create an equitable fee simple in land and that the question whether or not such an estate had been effectively created could be resolved by discovery fromthe instrument in question of the intention of the donor, or the settlor as the case may be. The Supreme Court of New South Wales in Sexton v. Horton had properly regarded itself as bound by that decision of the High Court and, finding the necessary intention, had declared the creation of an equitable fee simple without there being technical words of limitation. But in 1921 the English Court of Appeal had decided to the contrary. Accordingly, the question arose on the appeal in Sexton v. Horton from the Supreme Court's declaration, whether or not the High Court should follow the Court of Appeal. The Court decided to reverse the Court's own decision and to follow the Court of Appeal.
It was said:
"In this Court we are not bound by the decisions of the Court of Appeal, but uniformity of decision upon the law of property in force both in England and in Australia is paramount. It is a sufficient reason for reconsidering Hunt v. Korn (1917) Of course, in this case, although uniformity of decision was expressed to be paramount, the Court seemed to find other reasons for preferring the decision of the Court of Appeal. But those reasons themselves involved acceptance of the view of the Court of Appeal.
In somewhat the same vein, was the reversal by the Court of one of its decisions relating to divorce. In 1937 the Court had decided that where a husband who has been deserted by his wife commits adultery before the expiration of the statutory period of desertion which would entitle him to a decree of divorce on the ground of desertion, the period of desertion so far expired is terminated even though the adultery is unknown to the wife. In 1939 the English Court of Appeal decided that:
"If a spouse commits adultery after he or she has been deserted, the desertion is not necessarily terminated as a matter of law, regardless of the question whether the deserting spouse knew of the adultery or whether it had any influence on his or her conduct. If it is left in doubt whether the respondent knew of the adultery or, if known, whether his or her conduct was affected by it, the petitioner would fail to discharge the burden of proof. The question is to be determined according to the circumstances of each case." (Earnshaw v. Earnshaw (1939) 2 All E.R. 698 at p. 699.)
The High Court in the case before it decided to forgo its own view and in the interests of uniformity to adopt the rule laid down by the Court of Appeal. One Justice said: "Technically this court is bound by the judgments of the Privy Council, but, as heretofore, we shall pay the highest respect to decisions of the English Appeal Court and to those of the Supreme Courts of the other Dominions and to the judgments of the Supreme Court of the United States of America on points of law common to the respective countries. In quest of uniformity the court may reconsider previous decisions, but with great reluctance in the case of old authorities on the strength of which many transactions may have been adjusted and rights determined {Concrete Constructions Pty. Ltd. v. Barnes (1938) "The question how far this court should defer to the decisions of the Court of Appeal is one to which an unqualified answer can hardly be given. But I think that if this court is convinced that a particular view of the law has been taken in England from which there is unlikely to be any departure, wisdom is on the side of the court's applying that view to Australian conditions, notwithstanding that the court has already decided the question in the opposite sense. The fact that we still believe in the correctness of our own decision, as I do in the present case, is not in itself an adequate ground for refusing to follow this course. If the point decided amounts to no more than a particular application of a principle about which there is no difference of opinion, no harm can come from our adhering to our decision. In the application of the law to the facts, divergences between English opinion and Australian opinion may be expected and it is a matter of little concern. But where a general proposition is involved the court should be careful to avoid introducing into Australian law a principle inconsistent with that which has been accepted in England. The common law is administered in many jurisdictions, and unless each of them guards against needless divergences of decision its uniform development is imperilled. Statutes based upon a common policy and expressed in the same or similar forms ought not to be given different operations. In this court some trouble has been taken to preserve consistency of decision, not only with English courts, but also with those of Canada and New Zealand. English courts cannot be expected to receive the decisions of the Dominions with the traditional respect which the courts of the Dominions pay to the decisions of the English courts, but it is disappointing to find that, upon the particular question with which we are concerned, the Court of Appeal did not take an opportunity of considering the judgment delivered by this court in Crown Solicitor (S.A.) I was counsel, a very young counsel, in Hall v. Wilkins (1933) 49 C.L.R. 661, when I hopefully sought special leave to appeal. I say hopefully because I thought conformably to its past performances the High Court might reconsider the matter and that the principle at stake was sufficiently important to warrant that consideration although only a small sum of money was directly involved. But, as you realise, my hopes were dashed. I remember being asked by one of the Justices whether I was more interested in a leading case than in that of my client! These passages are illustrative of the very real endeavours made to maintain the uniformity of the common law within the British Commonwealth so far as the High Court could do so. I would wish you to keep this in mind for in the end the Privy Council gave a decision to which I shall later refer and which it might be thought ultimately denied the virtue of maintaining that uniformity.
Waghorn v. Waghorn {supra) was decided by the High Court in 1942. In the following year the Court had to consider whether it would follow a decision of the House of Lords in preference to one of its own. By name, the case was Piro v. W. Foster & Co. Ltd. (1943) This decision was remarkable, not so much for the readiness of the Court to follow the House of Lords but for its direction to the State Courts to follow such decisions rather than its own decisions. This, as it seems to me, was really an abdication of its own responsibility as a Court of Appeal within each of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0021223700002302
State system-the House of Lords quite clearly not being within any one of such systems. It was one thing for the Court to decide for itself in the cause of uniformity of decision in matters of general principle that it would accept and adopt as its own the rules declared by the House of Lords. It was quite another to give to the State courts a direction to consider for themselves firstly whether inconsistency exists between a decision of the High Court and a decision of the House of Lords itself and in the event that the State Court decides that there is inconsistency, secondly, that the State Court should follow the decision of the House of Lords in preference to that of the High Court. However, as we shall see as we proceed, this view did not ultimately prevail.
In 1948 a question arose in the High Court as to the standard of proof of adultery required in a matrimonial cause. The High Court had earlier, in the year 1938 to be precise, decided that adultery in such a suit, need not be established beyond reasonable doubt as guilt must be in a criminal trial, but that it was sufficient to prove it on a clear balance of probabilities. Meantime, however, the Court of Appeal had decided in 1948 that adultery must be established according to the criminal onus of proof. The Court on this occasion refused to follow the English Court of Appeal and endorsed its own earlier view of the matter. Mr. Justice Dixon in judgment said this: "For myself, I have in the past regarded it as better that this Court should conform to English decisions which we think have settled the general law in that jurisdiction than that we should be insistent on adhering to reasoning which we believe to be right but which will create diversity in the development of legal principle. Diversity in the development of the common law (using that expression not in the historical but in the very widest sense) seems to me to be an evil. Its avoidance is more desirable than a preservation here of what we regard as sounder principle. But there is great difficulty in being sure of what has been finally settled in England. brought forward a stream of difficulties, the greater number of which had been faced and solved long before in Australia. The observation it is true has not very much significance with reference to the question before us. For it happens that, before Briginshaw v. Briginshaw (1938) 60 C.L.R. 336, some authority did exist in Australia for the view taken in Ginesi v. Ginesi [1948] P. 179. On this occasion I am prepared to concur with the opinion that we ought to adhere to our own decision and not abandon it in favour of that of the Court of Appeal in Ginesi v. Ginesi. Briginshaw v. Briginshaw is a well-considered decision based on as complete an examination and survey of the subject as we could make. So much cannot be • said of Ginesi v. Ginesi. Of late years English courts have from time to time dealt in almost an unconsidered fashion with the standard of persuasion in reference to issues in civil proceedings involving crime, fraud or moral turpitude, that is, without going back to earlier case law inconsistent with assertions that have been casually made. Needless to say the assertions have been made without a study of the learning collected in Wigmore on Evidence: cf. Helton v. Allen These words of this most distinguished judge are particularly to be noted. His various reasons for not allowing uniformity to be the paramount consideration are each of consequence. But, over all the particular reasons there hangs, though perhaps but obscurely, a pall of dissatisfaction with the course of English decisions generally. Later, this Justice, when Chief Justice of the Court, much more openly criticised a decision of the House of Lords and was instrumental in a predominant degree in hastening the ultimate position which the Court has reached in relation to English authority, other than that derived from the decisions of the Privy Council.
In 1953 an appeal in a matter involving stamp duty imposed by the legislation of a State was unsuccessfully carried to the Privy Council from a decision of the High Court. The subject matter of the case is of no present interest. But it is worth quoting from their Lordships' decision a passage which at the one moment reflects what is perhaps their Lordships' inadequate appreciation of how far the movement away from mere acceptance of English authority had gone in Australia at that time and, at the same time, indicates how far the Privy Council of that time still found value in uniformity of decision within the British Commonwealth where the common law attitudes to statutory construction still prevailed. Their Lordships said this:
"Their Lordships note that it is the practice of the Australian courts in questions of law and equity common to both countries to follow the decisions of the Court of Appeal in England where the decisions of of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0021223700002302 [1961] A.C. 290. You will remember the facts. The accused was told by a constable to bring to a halt the car he was driving on a public street: but the accused, instead, accelerated. The constable grasped and clung to the side of the car which was deliberately driven by the accused upon an erratic course in an attempt to shake the constable off the car. In time the attempt succeeded. The constable dropped from the car. He fell to the roadway where another car ran over him, causing him fatal injuries. The accused was convicted of capital murder. On appeal, the House of Lords sustained the conviction on the footing that though there was no actual intent to kill, the required malice aforethought could be found by the jury to exist if grievous bodily harm was thought by them to be the natural and probable result of the accused's unlawful and voluntary act, in driving his car in the manner described with the constable clinging to the car.
The following year the High Court heard an appeal in which the question was whether in a murder trial there was any evidence of provocation to warrant a verdict of manslaughter. Chief Justice Dixon in a dissenting judgment which later found approval in the Privy Council thought that there was evidence of provocation sufficient to be put to the jury and that the conviction for murder could not stand. Having so expressed himself he proceeded:
"In Stapleton v. The Queen (1952) 86 C.L.R. 358 we said: 'The introduction of the maxim or statement that a man is presumed to intend the reasonable consequences of his act is seldom helpful and always dangerous ' (1952) 86 C.L.R., at p. 365. That was some years before the decision in Director of Public Prosecutions v. Smith [1961] A.C. 290, which seems only too unfortunately to confirm the observation. I say too unfortunately for I think it forces a critical situation in our (Dominion) relation to the judicial authority as precedents of decisions in England. Hitherto I have thought that we ought to follow decisions of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0021223700002302 of the House of Lords, at the expense of our own opinions and cases decided here, but having carefully studied Smith's Case [1961] A.C. 290 I think that we cannot adhere to that view or policy. There are propositions laid down in the judgment which I believe to be misconceived and wrong. They are fundamental and they are propositions which I could never bring myself to accept. I shall not discuss the case. There has been enough discussion and, perhaps I may add, explanation, to make it unnecessary to go over the ground once more. I do not think this present case really involves any of the so-called presumptions but I do think that the summing-up drew the topic into the matter even if somewhat unnecessarily and therefore if I left it on one side some misunderstanding might arise. I wish there to be no misunderstanding on the subject. I shall not depart from the law on the matter as we had long since laid it down in this Court and I think Smith's Case should not be used as authority in Australia at all." (Parker v. The Queen (1962 -1963 111 C.L.R. 610 at p. 632.)
The strength of the Chief Justice's conviction as to the unsoundness of the decision of the House of Lords is evident from the change in his attitude towards English precedent which this passage manifests. The earlier quotations I have made, some from the earlier judgments of that Chief Justice, make this change the more dramatic. He had been amongst those willing in the interests of uniformity of decision to follow not merely the House of Lords but also the Court of Appeal even when not wholly convinced of the correctness of the decision followed. But in terms, the directions with which the passage concludes were limited to the case of Director of Public Prosecutions v. Smith. However, as we shall see the Chief Justice's remarks contained sufficient generality to spark off a wider change in Australia "in our relation to the judicial authority as precedents of decisions in England". His Honour, now in his retirement, has had the satisfaction of seeing the reversal of this decision of the House of Lords by Act of Parliament; see the Criminal Justice Act 1967, section 8.
The next step in the development which I have been describing for you is a case dealing with the measure of damages for injuries in a road accident where a plaintiff was rendered permanently unconscious by his injuries and thus of the fact that his expectation of life had been grievously shortened. The subject matter had received judicial attention in a number of English cases. The Court did not follow them, striking out for itself in the decision it gave on the question of precedent. One Justice said:
"The position of this Court in relation to decisions of the House of Lords does not seem to me to need clarification. The Court is not, in a strict sense, bound by such decisions, but it has always recognized and must necessarily recognize their peculiarly high persuasive value. Moreover the reasoning of any judgment delivered in their Lordships' House, whether dissenting or concurring, commands and must always command our most respectful attention. The Court is, of course, bound of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0021223700002302
by directly apposite decisions of the Privy Council. Other courts in Australia are bound by such decisions of the Privy Council, and, subject to that, are bound by decisions of this Court. I should perhaps add, though it has become obvious enough in recent years, that nothing in the judgments in Piro v. W. Foster & Co. Ltd. (1943) 68 C.L.R. 313 can have the effect of a general charter to Australian courts to act upon an assumption that this Court will treat itself as if technically bound by decisions of the House of Lords, or should be treated as having in any degree diminished the binding force of decisions of this Court." (Skelton v. Collins (1965 -1966 "But before deciding which line I should adopt, I think it desirable to set out what I believe to be the approach which we, in the High Court, should now make when we are required to consider whether we should follow a decision of the House of Lords. In Piro v. W. Foster & Co. Ltd. Latham C.J., after referring to the desirability that there should be uniformity of decision on matters of legal principle and expressing the opinion that to achieve that end this Court and other courts in Australia should as a general rule follow decisions of the House of Lords, went on to say that 'it will be a wise general rule of practice that in cases of clear conflict between a decision of the House of Lords and of the High Court, this Court, and other courts in Australia, should follow a decision of the House of Lords upon matters of general legal principle' (1943) 68 C.L.R., at p. 320. To much the same effect were the remarks of other members of the Court. In pursuance of this rule of practice the High Court has on occasions overruled or refused to follow its own earlier decisions when they were thought to have been in conflict with the law as later laid down in English courts. For example, in Waghorn v. Waghorn (1942) 65 C.L.R. 289, the Court for this reason refused to follow its earlier decision in Crown Solicitor (S.A.) v. Gilbert (1937) 59 C.L.R. 322, and in Piro's Case (1943) This passage, in my opinion, defines the course that should now be followed. Where, however, there is no decision of the High Court on a question that arises in some other Australian court and a decision of the House of Lords is directly in point, the court which is called upon to decide the question will no doubt follow the decision." ((1965-1966) 115 C.L.R. 94 at p. 137.)
One of these Justices added:
"And we, in this Court, need not, in exercising our functions as an appellate tribunal, be deterred by expressions of opinion in their Lordships' House in old cases or new cases. Nevertheless I believe that we must not only give respectful attention to whatever is said there, but that the decision of the majority of their Lordships on questions of common law will ordinarily be followed in this Court, leaving it to the Australian legislatures to correct the result if they think fit. In a case by the name of Rejfek v. McElroy (1965) 112 C.L.R. 517 an appeal was brought from a decision of the Supreme Court of a State which involved the standard of proof of fraud in a civil action. The High Court in more than one case had said that fraud in a civil suit need only be established on the probabilities. But Lord Atkin on several occasions when sitting in the Privy Council in appeals from courts other than the courts of Australia had said by way of obiter dicta that fraud in such a case must be established beyond any reasonable doubt. One such instance was Narayanan Chettyar v. Official Assignee of the High Court, Rangoon (1941) 39 Allahabad L.J. 683. The Queensland Supreme Court had preferred the dictum of the Privy Council to the decisions of the High Court and decided in more than one case that fraud in a civil action in Queensland must be established beyond all reasonable doubt. The High Court, however, in the appeal from one of such decisions, once again affirmed that the standard of proof required of fraud in a civil action was not the criminal but the civil standard. In giving judgment, it made it clear that the State Court was bound by the High Court's decision and was not entitled to displace it by a dictum as distinct from a Privy Council decision precisely in point. The Court said:
"The Supreme Court of Queensland, in our opinion, quite clearly was bound at the time of the decision of King v. Crowe (1942) St.R. Qd. 288 (an earlier Queensland decision) and thereafter to follow the decision of this Court in Helton v. Allen (1940) . 63 C.L.R. 691 (a decision of the High Court) and was in error in not doing so. That case (i.e. King v. Crowe) and the cases antecedent and subsequent to it (i.e. decisions of the Queensland Supreme Court) which decided that the criminal standard of proof had to be satisfied in civil proceedings as to facts which amounted to a crime should to that extent be overruled." (p. 521) Of course, this holding of the High Court is binding on all the courts of Australia, not merely upon those of Queensland from which the particular appeal was brought.
Within a year the matter was carried somewhat farther. A State Supreme Court in giving judgment had reasoned that a decision of the High Court precisely in point to the matter in hand and itself definitive of that matter was inconsistent with the reasoning of the Privy Council in a subsequent case. The State Court did not follow the decision of the High Court. The subject matter was the statutory validity of a regulation relating to lifts and scaffolding. The High Court in an appeal from the decision of the State Supreme Court reversing that Court said in judgment that: "Unless this case (i.e. the High Court's earlier decision) was overruled by the Privy Council, it was binding upon the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales and that Court ought not to have held that reg. 73(2) was invalid. It is not, in my opinion, for a Supreme Court of a State to decide that a decision of this Court precisely in point ought now to be decided differently because it appears to the Supreme Court to be inconsistent with reasoning of the Judicial Committee in a subsequent case. If the decision of this Court is to be overruled, it must be by the Judicial Committee, or by this Court itself. It cannot be treated by a Supreme Court as if it were overruled. The matter is, of course, different where this Court's decision is not precisely in point and comparison has to be made merely between two lines of reasoning;.. ." {Jacob v. Utah Construction and Engineering Pty. Ltd. (1966) 116 C.L.R. 200 (at p. 207) .)
It would now seem that Australian courts must follow a decision of the High Court and do so even if a decision not definitive of the subject matter or reasoning of the Privy Council might appear inconsistent with that decision of the High Court. The question of consistency or inconsistency will not be one for the State Court. That Court will not be able to prefer a decision of the House of Lords to one of the High Court. They will prefer a decision of the Privy Council to a decision of the House of Lords. The High Court, bound only by the decisions of the Privy Council, can review and in a proper case will review its own previous decision and will not necessarily accept a decision of the House of Lords, or of the Court of Appeal, of the propriety of which it is not convinced.
In so far as the litigant must await the decision of the High Court where decisions which might or might not be inconsistent are said to exist, there may be a degree of inconvenience in the somewhat emphatic rule laid down by the High Court in the cases to which I have referred. Expense or delay in litigation at times gives one litigant a significant advantage over the other. Consequently these are features to be avoided where possible. But, on the other hand, there is a clear advantage in having the High Court itself decide such a question as the consistency or otherwise of its decisions with those of the Privy Council. Cases may of course arise where because of the terms of the decision of the Privy Council the matter is clearly beyond question. But such cases must of necessity be rare and the generality of the High Court's rule is not really affected by them.
To resume the main stream, it can be seen that the High Court has established itself as the source of authority in precedent in Australia for the courts of the States wherever it has decided the matter. Where there is no decision by the High Court, the State courts must decide according to such decisions as exist whether Australian or English or for that matter of any court in a common law jurisdiction. But, having regard to the latter attitude of the High Court towards English decisions as precedent, it might seem that the State courts do well to scrutinize the tendencies to be found in the judgments of the High Court and to make that decision which is the more likely to find acceptance in the High Court. After all, although appeals may be taken to the Privy Council in matters of non-federal law, most cases end in the High Court. Thus, the highest probability is that any appeal which is brought against the State Court decision will be taken to the High Court. I have already indicated the possibilities of conflict, which also need to be borne in mind.
The most recent steps in the development of the relationship of Australian courts to English decisions have been taken in a case concerning the measure of damages in defamation. The appeal in the case was decided in the High Court in 1966. The question was as to the occasions when exemplary or punitive damages can properly be awarded in an action for defamation. The trial judge had directed the jury who tried the facts that if they found that the publication of the libel by the defendant (a daily newspaper with a large circulation) was made out of ill will to the plaintiff and as part of a campaign against the plaintiff (who was a member of the national Parliament) they could award exemplary or punitive damages. Decisions of the High Court prior to 1964 had dealt with this topic and had settled the law so far as Australian courts were concerned in the sense of the trial judge's direction. However, in Rookes v. Barnard [1964] A.C. 1129 a decision had been given by the House of Lords which most materially restricted the categories of cases in which exemplary or punitive damages might be given. The resultant area was considerably less than that which was allowed by the decisions of the High Court. The unsuccessful defendant in the defamation action brought an appeal to the High Court.
The Court followed its own decisions and refused to follow the decision of the House of Lords in relation to the awarding of punitive or exemplary damages. However, for reasons particular to the case, the High Court set of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0021223700002302 aside the verdict of the jury awarding the plaintiff a very large sum for damages and ordered a new trial of the action. The Privy Council gave the defendant, the successful appellant in the High Court, special leave to appeal, apparently to enable a decision to be made as to the proper direction to be given in the new trial which had yet to take place as to the measure of damages in the circumstances of the case.
Thus, in the appeal which resulted, the Judicial Committee had the opportunity to differ from the House of Lords, or to differ from the High Court. Though formally the House of Lords would not have been bound by the decision of the Privy Council, a decision in either sense would have contributed considerably towards uniformity of principle in the common law as operative both in the United Kingdom and in the countries of the British Commonwealth. However, the Privy Council affirmed the judgment of the High Court and its view of the proper direction to be given to a jury in a defamation action with respect to exemplary or punitive damages.
In concluding their judgment, their Lordships said this:
"The issue that faced the High Court in the present case was whether the law as it had been settled in Australia should be changed. Had the law developed by processes of faulty reasoning or had it been founded upon misconceptions it would have been necessary to change it. Such was not the case. In the result in a sphere of the law where its policy calls for decision and where its policy in a particular country is fashioned so largely by judicial opinion it became a question for the High Court to decide whether the decision in Rookes v. Barnard compelled a change in what was a well settled judicial approach in the law of libel in Australia. Their Lordships are not prepared to say that the High Court was wrong in being unconvinced that a changed approach in Australia was desirable." (Australian Consolidated Press Ltd. v. Uren (1967) 41 A.L.J.R. 66 at p. 74.)
Whilst it might, be said that the question before the High Court was whether it would depart from its own prior decision, it might respectfully be doubted whether that was the question before their Lordships of the Privy Council. It might well be thought that the question before them was really what was the proper direction to be given according to the common law upon the topic of the occasions for the award of punitive or exemplary damages. Thus, by stating the question before the High Court rather than the question before the Board, it seems that the need to decide which was the right view of the law, that of Rookes v. Barnard or that of the High Court in the case under appeal, might appear to have been avoided. But one is entitled to consider if it really was. By agreeing that the prior decisions of the High Court in a sense opposite to that of Rookes v. Barnard were not developed by any faulty processes of reasoning or founded on misconception, their Lordships, whatever the form of their expressions, can scarcely be doing less than affirming the view of the common law enunciated by the High Court.
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Of course, if the expressions used by their Lordships were all taken literally their Lordships were merely deciding that the High Court was right in not being convinced that it should change the Court's former decision and substitute therefor a decision in a contrary sense conformable to the decision of the House of Lords. But, as I have said, that can scarcely be acceptable as a reading of the judgment. Did they not really make the High Court's decision their own? Yet the fact that their Lordships did not expressly approve the substance of the High Court's decision and reject the view of the House of Lords is more than significant. Taking the form of the reasons for judgment and emphasising the references to policy in relation to a particular country one cannot avoid the conclusion that their Lordships were indeed denying the virtue of uniformity of decision in such an important matter of general principle as was involved in the case before them. It could be said that there has emerged with a clarity not earlier perceived a common law of England and a common law of Australia.
Thus, after the long years of endeavour on the part of the colonial courts, and latterly of the courts of the States, and indeed, of the High Court itself to attain or at least to contribute towards uniformity of decision in matters of general principle in the common law, at least as between the United Kingdom and Australia, it seems to me that the commentator can scarcely be blamed for concluding that the Privy Council itself has given what may yet prove the final quietus to this endeavour. Of course, it may be that there is no virtue now in maintaining such uniformity or it may be that there is no commercial necessity for doing so or it may be that due to differing social development in the different parts of the British Commonwealth it is no longer possible with justice in each place to maintain uniformity of decision, even in matters of fundamental principle. But, for my own part, I cannot call to mind any purely Australian circumstance which would call for differential treatment as to the award of exemplary damages in defamation.
A remarkable feature of this case is that after the grant of special leave and some twelve months before the judgment in the appeal itself was given by their Lordships of the Privy Council, the Lord Chancellor had made his historic announcement that thereafter the law Lords would not regard themselves as bound by the prior decisions of the House of Lords. Thus, at the time the Privy Council heard the appeal in the libel case, the common law in England was not finally settled and unalterable by judicial decision. One is entitled in a lecture such as this to speculate as to what might have happened if their Lordships of the Privy Council had expressly adopted the views of the High Court.
You will recall that I mentioned earlier that it had been assumed in colonial days that a decision of the Privy Council in an appeal from any colonial court was binding on the court of each and every colony. It is not without interest that both the Privy Council and the Supreme Court of New South Wales within recent times had occasion to remark on this matter. In 1968, a Judge in Equity in the Supreme Court of New South Wales in a suit before him followed a decision of the Privy Council given in an appeal from New Zealand. In judgment, the Judge said that the Privy Council decision (which was precisely in point in relation to the matter the Judge had in hand) was "absolutely binding upon this Court" (the Supreme Court) "just as if it were a decision of the High Court". Earlier I reminded you of the Lord Chancellor's pronouncement as to the future practice of the House of Lords with respect to its former decisions. The High Court is in the same situation where no precise decision of the Privy Council exists. It is free to decide according to law as it understands it and to review its own decisions. It will readily be appreciated that the wide range of matters which can be brought before the High Court must naturally afford a considerable opportunity for careful re-examination of precedents and for departure from them when circumstances warrant that exceptional course. If uniformity of development of the common law within the British Commonwealth is not a paramount consideration, the law may be developed appropriately to the social and economic development of the Australian nation. Thus far it seems the movement in acceptance of precedent which I have attempted to relate to you has gone. But, as with other institutions derived from British origins, diversity does not necessarily connote lack of cohesion. Consequently, though its applications may vary within the British Commonwealth, the endeavour nonetheless will be to interpret and apply the common law. In statutory construction, the approach to discover meaning will be the approach of a common law court. These basic and abiding elements may produce a uniformity more meaningful than mere identity in particular solutions. However, time alone can provide the proof of this speculation. Meantime it would seem that adherence to precedents which have developed in a different juristic unit has given way to independent examination and self-expression on the part of a new nation. These, however, are but a few facets of what I hope has been for you an interesting subject. Time will not permit of further exploration. I can only hope I have clearly drawn for you a picture of a development in the use of precedent which federation made possible and which has not merely complemented the growth of a national sentiment but to a substantial degree has contributed to it.
